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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
The field of human communication theory is broad and interdis
ciplinary in character.

Investigators in the area draw upon many fields

in efforts to describe and elucidate the processes involved in man*s
communicative activities.

This is as it should be, for communication

not only makes human society possible as we know it, but, in a sense,
society is the result of myriad communicative exchanges.

Looked at in

another way, the processes of inter-human communication are the counter
part of human, symbolic thought.

In view of the above, it is small

wonder that questions concerning the nature and function of language
have become of increasing importance tq many areas of professional in
terest, including linguistics, philosophy, psychology, sociology, poli
tical science, rhetoric, and group dynamics— to name but a few from a
long list.
The purpose of the present work is to set forth an approach to
the study of one aspect of human communicative activity.

The questions

to be explored in the following pages have to do with the nature of
human understanding.

The central question to be examined is: what is

there about human, symbolic understandings which makes them capable of
being communicated?
At this point it might be well to make clear that the scope of
-1-

-2the present study does not extend to all of man*s communicative behav
ior.

The communication of aesthetic or moral values, for example, is

deliberately excluded from consideration, as well as any understanding
of things or events in the world that is not mediated symbolically.
Thus the whole area of non-symbolic, gesturally communicated meanings
between individuals is not treated.
In the present work, attention is centered on one dimension of
man’s communicative behavior: the communication between individuals of
symbolically structured conceptual frameworks.

The problem is further

limited to situations in which one individual is presumed to have a
complexly structured conceptual framework (i.e., an interconnected sys
tem of concepts by which he orders and coordinates his experience) and
the intention of communicating this framework to another individual.
The relationship between human understanding and conceptual
frameworks to be developed in what follows is that an individual’s use
of a conceptual framework constitutes his understanding.

The term

"human understanding," as it will be employed in the present work, is
to be thought of as a psychological system by means of which some por
tion of an individual’s experience is ordered and made a part of his
working conceptualization of reality.

The nature of such understandings

will be one of the principal problems to be explored in the following
chapters.

However, bearing in mind that most of the ideas being used

are to be developed in later chapters, attempt might still be made to
give some more explicit notion of the type of communication to be ex
amined later.

Such an attempt follows below.

Communication, as it will be discussed in the present work,

-3should be thought of as the transfer of understandings via the communi
cation of conceptual frameworks.

In accordance with the above stated

relationship between understandings and conceptual frameworks, communi
cation as the transfer of understandings might be formulated as follows:
individual A has an understanding which consists in the use of a parti
cular conceptual frameworkj when communicated to individual B, B?s un
derstanding of A may be taken as his achieved ability to use the con
ceptual framework communicated by A.

Viewed in this way, it can be

seen that the result of the communicative exchange is to effect a change
in B’s ways of ordering the world— or at least to increase the ways in
which he may choose to order his understanding of the world.

Further

more, since as was stated we may regard an individual’s ordered under
standing of the world as a psychological system, we may define communi
cation as the effect of a message upon the psychological system of a
receiver. A revised definition of communication which includes this
?

A
\

last view of the process would be: communication is the transfer of
understandings via the communication of conceptual frameworks which
result in a reordering of a person’s psychological system or understand
ing.
The usefulness of the above formulation, of course, depends upon
our abilities to unravel and solve problems concerning the nature of
understanding when it is conceived of in this way.

Fortunately, what

seems a very useful approach to the problem of dealing with understand
ing when it Is thought of as the use of conceptual frameworks is to be
found in the area of the philosophy of science. The approach consists
in efforts on the part of writers in the area to explicate the scientist’s

-4understanding of the world. Three waiters, Stephen Toulmin,'1' David
2
3
Hawkins, and Ernst Cassirer, have worked out notions of the nature
of scientific understanding in terms of strikingly similar conceptions
as a symbolic restructuring of relevant concepts.

Scientific discovery

as explicated by Toulmin, Hawkins and Cassirer has as its result nothing
more than ordinary human understanding, describable as a comprehension
of a particular conceptual framework.
At this time it might be well to insert a comment on the approach
to the general subject of language usage employed in the present study.
As already indicated, no pretense is made of treating definitively the
whole subject of language usage.

It is the writer’s goal in the fol

lowing Chapters to create a synthesis of views on the subject of what
gets communicated in the communication of conceptually realized under
standings.

The writers discussed in the following chapters are sel

ected because their views seem capable of being fitted into the kind of
synthesis desired, and because, although far from being of a piece,
their views seem in varying degrees compatible with the desired synthe
sis.

It thus might be said that the fitting together of selected views

on language usage is as much a function of the desire of the writer to
see them synthesized as it is a function ©f some commonality of views
and interests on the part of the writers selected.

The efficacy of

■^Stephen Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science (lew York: Harper
and Row, Publishers, 19537"^
2
David Hawkins, The Language of Mature (Sam Francisco: W.H.
Freeman and Go., 1964).
JErnst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (Hew Haven: Yale University
Press, 1944), and The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (Three Vols., Hew
Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), I*

-5this approach must of course depend upon whether or not the obtained
synthesis aids in an explanation of the communication of complex, con
ceptual frameworks.
Turning now to an attempt to make clearer how some better under
standing of the nature of the scientist* s working conceptions could aid
in setting forth a workable view of communication, we might briefly com
pare our usage of our own everyday formulations of things with the scient
ist* s usage of theoretical formulations.

As will become clearer in a

later discussion of scientific discovery, the scientist creates or sees
the relevance of an already present structured way of seeing things,
which is then applied to the world.
constitutes his theory.

His structured way of seeing things

The scientist is trained to be very self-con

scious in his use of theoretical formulations and is sophisticated con
cerning the relations between his theories and observational facts. We,
in our everyday usage of culturally transmitted and individually created
formulations of things are not so self-conscious about relations between
them and the occurrance of events in the world which could be taken as
confirming them. We do not, to use a view expounded by Toulmin (and
one that will receive considerable attention later), commonly see con
firming instances as evidence that our working conceptualizations of
things can be applied in these cases.^ On the contrary, we commonly
see them as just another instance of t!the way things are.'*
We might note that there is often a great difference in the
nlevel of reality11 attributed to working formulations on the part of
^Toulmin, 112-113.

scientists and on the part of people in their everyday lives.

let, in

both cases the individuals involved are making use of conceptually
structured ways of looking at things— i.e., conceptual frameworks, and
in each case this usage goes to make up an understanding of the world.
A later discussion of the individual1s total understanding as put for
ward by Kenneth Boulding'’ will help support the view that our total
understanding is a composite of many conceptual frameworks as they have
been discussed thus far, loaded with valuations and that sometimes they
are only partial insights and inferences.

In the present work, interest

will center on the completely realized conceptual frameworks within a
person*s total understanding, minus their valuative loading.

To attempt

more would be to go beyond the scope of the present study.
What is sought is a general notion of understanding to use in
explicating what gets communicated in an exchange between two people.
The relative clarity of the scientist*s understanding gives insight
into the nature of understanding in general and, therefore, is useful
to examine.

If a notion of what is communicated is developed, it is

assumed that we may then turn to an examination of how it is communi
cated with some better, more workable notion of how to deal with this
latter problem.
We might now turn attention to possibilities of relating the
conception of communication as the transfer of understandings to other
approaches to the subject of information transfer.

Other investigators

concerned with human communication have recognized the need for some
5Kenneth Boulding, The Image. (Ann Arbors University of Michigan
Press, 1956).

-7explanation of what goes on within sources and receivers of information.
They have also recognized the need for an explanation of what constitutes
the meaningful content of messages.

However, rather than attempt to

describe and discuss all of these alternative approaches to these pro
blems, it seems better to show how the present approach conforms to wiiat
seems to the writer to be the most closely related current statements
by theorists of meaning on the subject of information transfer.

In each

case reasons will be given for departing from these approaches.
The proposed conception of communication is not completely with
out precedent in the area of theorizing about human communication.

How

ever, it does seem to be a conception that has not received very exten
sive treatment.

Upon examination it can be seen to conform, although

somewhat loosely, to the philosopher Charles Morris* conception of the
pragmatic aspects of language usage. As Morris defines it, ** *Pragma
tics* is that portion of semiotic which deals with the origin, uses, and
6
effects of signs within the behavior in which they occur.” In the
following chapters the concern will be almost exclusively with symbols
and not signs.

However, once this distinction is made clear, the area

of language usage set forth by Morris as the pragmatic dimension seems
adequately to describe the area of present interest. Furthermore, as
Charles L. Stevenson has pointed out, it is possible to identify the
pragmatic aspects of language usage with the psychological reactions of
the users of the language. 7 In other words, pragmatics, in Stevenson*s
^Charles Morris, Signs. Language and Behavior (lew York! PrenticeHall, Inc., 1946), 219.
7
Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (Mew Haven: Yale
University Press, 1944), 42.

-gversion, is concerned with the effects of messages upon the psychological
systems of the participants of a communicative exchange. This latter
formulation of pragmatics, it should be noted, fits quite well with the
previously given formulation of communication. To reiterate, in the com
munication of conceptually structured understandings, we are concerned
with the effects of messages upon a psychological system which is the
receiver*s structured understanding of the world.
As stated, the pragmatic dimension of language usage has received
relatively little attention from theorists. What Morris provides is
more a statement of where such a conception would fit within a total
framework than a detailed description of what such a conception would be
and now it would function.

Morris* treatment is further limited by the

fact that he attempted to make his science of s@Ed.otic so broad.

His

efforts to treat all linguistic behavior as sign behavior might account
for his attempt to reduce symbolic behavior to sign behavior— i.e., some
thing explainable in terms of sign behavior— and make it treatable in
terms of a contiguity-reinforcement theory of learning.

As Charles

Osgood, et. al., have pointed out, Morris* attempt to anchor semiotic in
behavioral learning theory runs into the danger that the response dis
positions he invokes to explain symbolic behavior may serve as "a mere
&
surrogate for *idea* without further explication.'*
It might also be noted that psychological systems, of which our
use of conceptually structured understandings is an example, have the
C.E. Osgood, G. Suci, and Pi Tannehbaum, "The Logic of Semantic
Differentiation," Psycholinguistics. S. Saporta, ed. (lew Tork: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), 286.

-9status of mediating constructs— -i.e., they are hypothetical inner states.
With the advent of Watsonian Behaviorism and the widespread adoption of
an operational methodology and orientation to research, inner states fell
into disfavor and have only recently become once again scientifically
respectable.

However, inner states as mediating constructs have proven

ever more useful to behavioral scientists of late— even though, as
Cronbach and leehl have stated, they are often couched in an operational
9
phraseology which belies their usage.
Its lack of scientific respect
ability might account for theorists* reluctance to investigate the nature
of understanding.

The regained status of inner states, i.e., meanings,

response tendencies, habit family hierarchies, second signal systems, ex
citatory potentials, attitudes, etc., as mediating constructs is an in
teresting subject in itself, but one that has received considerable at
tention elsewhere. The reader interested in pursuing the subject further
is referred to discussions by Cronbach and leehl,lulon Wells,and
12
Charles L. Stevenson.
Even when employing mediating constructs in treating meaning,
one finds a prevalent tendency to deal with aspects of meaning rather
far down the conceptual ladder, i.e., in terms of the relation between
meaning and referent.

Theorists taking this approach, for example,

9
L. Cronbach and P.E. leehl, "Construct Validity in Psychological
Tests," Psychological Bulletin. LII, Hay 1955, 300.
10
Ibid.. 281-302.
11
Hulon Wells, "leaning and Use," Psycholinguistics. 269-283.

■^Stevenson.

-10■JO

Charles Osgood, et. al.,

1 I

and Soger Brown and Don E. Dulaney,

do not

treat meanings that are represented by symbols as having a created, con
textual nature, i.e., as being meaningful within the structure of a con
text.

They seem far too concerned with finding its "elements" and its

ways of coining to be associated with a referent. For contiguity-reinforcement theorists the meaning of a symbol seems little more than an
arbitrary connection between a label and a referent which is made be
cause of temporally contiguous reward.
The level of meaning commonly treated by a contiguity-reinforcement theory of symbolization will be dealt with in the following chapters
15
16
in a fashion expounded by Joseph Church and Erast Cassirer.
In the
views of these theorists, meaning at this level is first simply the
infantas reaction to a non-linguistic interpretation of its environment.
Later symbols come to represent these meanings.
Here it might be well to take note of the fact that the usage of
condeptual frameworks as they are presently employed is at least three
stages away from meaning at the first non-linguistic level.

In the mean

ing hierarchy to be developed in the following chapter, there are first
such non-linguistic interpretations, then symbols, concepts, and finally
conceptual frameworks.
13
G.E. Osgood, et. al., 300.
■^Eoger Brown and Don E. Dulaney, "A Stimulus-Response Analysis
of Language and leaniBg,,, Language Thought and Culture. Paul Henle, ed.
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958), 49-98.
^Joseph Chureh, Language and the Discovery of Reality (Mew York:
Random House, 1961).
16
Cassirer, Essay . . . and Philosophy . . .. I.

-11The individual1s use of symbols and concepts in conceptually
structuring his experience is of vital importance to the present approach
to the study of the communication of understandings.

let it seems to

be a methodological limitation of a contiguity-reinforcement approach
that it restricts the theorizer to a referential orientation to meaning,
is Osgood et. al. admit in their discussion of semantic differentiation,
the broader scope of the theory of the semantic differential was obtain
ed at the sacrifice of a direct tie-in with the learning theory conception of meaning which was desired to support it.17 It would seem that
theorists treating meaning with-a contiguity-reinforcement theory have a
very long road to travel before reaching a vantage point where they will
be able to deal with the use of symbols in creatively treating experi
ence to obtain new conceptual orderings of the world.

As Heinz Werner

and Bernard Kaplan have stated,
It seems to us that it is well-nigh impossible to account
for symbol-realism in terms of a contiguity-reinforcement
theory of symbolization, that is, in terms of a theory
that reduces symbols to signs. leither animals nor humans,
insofar as they respond to entities qua signs, confuse the
sign with what it indicates or foreshadows; no conditioned
dog treats a beU or buzzer as ifit were of the same sub
stance as the food it signalizes or indicates; no normal
man opens his umbrella to protect himself against clouds
or thunder as signs of rain.1
The referential function of symbols is thus seen to be only a part of
their nature; their representational function is something that will be
expounded upon in later discussions following the lead of Cassirer.
Thus far a conception of communication as the transfer of under17
Osgood, et. al., 300*
IS
Heinz Werner and'Bernard Kaplan, Symbol Formation (lew York;
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963), 36.

-12standings has been put forward.

The position has been taken that the

process might be fruitfully viewed as one involving, not the direct com
munication of understandings, but rather the communication of conceptual
frameworks which, in their comprehension and incorporation into the psych
ological system of the receiver, amount to an understanding on the part
of the receiver.
To meet problems encountered in explicating the process in this
suggested way, it has been proposed that the use of conceptual struct
uring as it is employed in science and is discussed by three philosophers
of science might serve in elucidating what gets communicated.

The sug

gested usage of conceptual frameworks has been shown to conform in some
ways with Morris» development of the pragmatic dimension of language
usage.

However, it has also been shovm that there is a certain amount

of difficulty in dealing with the pragmatic dimension of language usage
in the way that Morris advocated.

An alternative method, following

the conceptions of language development advanced by Church and Cassirer,
has been suggested.

In the following chapter, a meaning hierarchy will

be developed in which symbols are created out of non-linguistic meanings,
then concepts and finally conceptual frameworks.

CHAPTER W O
THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURING OF EXPERIENCE THROUGH SYMBOLS
In this chapter we will be concerned with the general subject of
language acquisition as a necessary stage in the individual1s creation
of conceptual realities.

The developmental psychology of Joseph Church

will be drawn upon up to the point of the attaining of symbolic meanings.
At this point attention will be turned to a discussion of the subject by
2
Cassirer, and continued to the desired conception of symbolic systems of
inter-related concepts.
Meaning Prior to Language
In his discussion of the subject, Joseph Church begins with the
assumption that the child is first a perceiver of meaning.3 The child
first perceives only personally meaningful objects.
Those objects and those properties of objects, stand out
which offer some relevance to the child in terms of pro
mise of threat or concrete action . . . . The child per
ceives only personally meaningful objects, and . . . what
he perceives is not so much the objects as their meanings.
Developmentally and microgenetically, meanings precede
objects in perception.^
Church terms perception at the above stage “physiognomic perception."
1
Church, Language and the Discovery of Reality.
2
Cassirer, Essay and Philosophy.
3
^Church, 4-5»
4Ibid.
-13-

-14The child perceives things, but he perceives them in terms of their tfphysiognomic-meaning qualities rather than their objective attributes.n5

An

object’s objective properties, such as size, shape and color, Church con
tends, are submerged in its general physiognomy and do not emerge as isolable perceptual dimensions until almost age two.

6

Physiognomic perception is not something restricted to the child’s
first perceptual experience.

Church further contends that this type of

perception continues into adulthood.
It is only when we scrutinize an object analytically or
jmdgmemtally or contemplatively that we cease to perceive
physiognomically. Unless we have some reason to analyze
an object we may live with it for years without ever not
ing many of its readily perceptible objective properties.'
The presence of physiognomic perception, it might be noted, is probably
less noticeable than it might be by virtue of the fact that few of the
things man views have not at one time or another been symbolically treat
ed, i.e., incorporated into a reality which is a symbolic formulation of
things. Furthermore there is the fact that, as Church points out above,
to think about an object, i.e., to contemplate it, is to cease to regard
it physiognomically.

Another fact which will be important in future dis

cussions of language usage should be noted in Church* s above'discussion.
It can be seen that, initially, the child experiences the world directly.
an object is first simply an "it.” This idea is one that will be useful
later, following the treatment of the subject by Cassirer.
The meanings which the child learns through physiognomic perception
are put together in terms of a '’schema.'* Church states, "The baby’s
5Ibid.

6Ibid.

7Ibid.. 6.

-15experience— what he leams— is consolidated as knowledge, and the most
8

fundamental form of knowledge is the schema.”
both logically and psychologically.

Church defines the schema

Logically, a schema is an "Implicit

principle by which we organize experience.”9 By this he means that, log
ically, schemata incorporate both recognition and implicit classification,
plus generalizations from experience (e.g., bottles, toys, etc., all fall
one direction, down), all of which are implicit until made explicit through
symbolic or linguistic formulation.

Church further says,

Psychologically . . . we become sensitive to the way things
are constituted and act, so that we perceive the environment
as coherent and orderly, in ways that the adult can make ex
plicit as principles but that, for the baby, exist only in
the sense that here is the world and things are under pretty
good control.
From the above definition, it can be seen that Church* s psychological use
of

schemata is that of a descriptive term.

out the environment.

Schemata are used insorting

As we have seen, they are learned in termsof physi

ognomic perception— at least at first— and together they go to make up
the child*s stock of non-symbolic meanings with regard to the world.
6

Church goes on to say that schemata can be either very general or
very specific.

The most general and all-pervasive schema is our orienta11
tion to a "broad spatial and temporal and situational framework.”
Our
sense of the enduring identity of physical objects is embodied in this
schema.

Schemata continue to develop and change throughout life, and they

will be a subject of particular interest later on in a discussion of gen
eral orientational frameworks.

At present our interest in them centers in

the fact the child’s preverbal meanings are incorporated in schemata. The
8Ibid., 36.

9Ibid.

10Ibld., 36-37.

i:LIbid., 37.

-16schematization of objects occurs with learning their enduring identitytheir constancy of size, shape, color,and brightness. 12

Space is schem

atized pragmatically in terms of direct experience, while time is similar
ly dealt with in sorting out the routine occurrences of the day, feeding
time, bath time, etc.
Up to this point we have been concerned with showing that the child*s
preverbal experience is one of meaningfully sorting out the environment,
that he comes to the learning of language with meanings for which langu
age will provide a new mode of expression.

However, in this chapter we

are not directly concerned with the child’s learning of language.

That

subject has already been adequately covered by Church in his own ejqaosition of the subject.

His views on the child’s non-linguistic world were

discussed because they will make more readily understandable the views of
Cassirer on the general subject of the development or acquisition of lan
guage in what follows.

To accept Cassirer’s position, it is necessary to

conceive of the individual as in some measure meaningfully perceiving the
world, and, in Church’s view, the child is engaged in just such meaning
ful perception from the start.
Symbolic Structuring
For Cassirer, the key to the understanding of man lies in his use
of the symbol.

The view of man set forth by Cassirer in his Essay on Han

and in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms is that man experiences little
direct confrontation with the worldj man’s view of the world is one that
is symbolically mediated.
12Ibid., 41.

In the man who has had the benefit of culture,

-17there is a world of symbolic meaningfulness which is then available to use
by the individual in understanding both himself and his culture. Han
lives in a new dimension of reality:
Man has, as it were, discovered a new method of adapting
himself to his environment. Between the receptor system
and the effector system, which are to be found in all an
imal species, we find in man a third link which we may
describe as the symbolic system. This new acquisition
transforms the whole of human life. As compared with the
other animals, man lives not merely in a broader reality;
he lives, so to speak, in a new dimension of reality.
In Cassirer*s view the power of man’s thought begins with the dis
covery that '’everything has a name.”^

What he is referring to is the

fact that everything man talks about is represented symbolically, that is,
in terms of symbols whose distinguishing characteristic is not their ex
plicitness of reference, but their preciseness of meaning and the versatil
ity they allow in using that meaning.

Symbols are tools of synthesis and

creation because, through them, meanings initially created through an
interaction with the world of experience, can be given stabiltiy and pernance by means of the act of giving them a name. Later, by virtue of be
ing treated symbolically, these meanings can be represented through the
use of the same name-symbols. What we will direct our attention to now
is the question of how such symbols come to be.
The symbol, in Cassirer’s discussion of it, is made possible be
cause of a sensed similarxty between sxtuations* The possibilxty of giv
ing a name rests on the individual’s concentration upon some property of
situations, some sensed similarity between them which, by naming it, gives
■^Cassirer, Essay. 24*
•^Ibid.. 34-35.

-18rise to a symbol.1** In Cassirer’s words,
The beginning of thought and speech is [jthatj . . . on
our own inititive we draw certain dividing lines, effect
certain separations and connection by virtue of which
distinct individual configurations emerge.16
To recall something from Church’s discussion, the child first experiences
the world directly, and, as a result of such interaction, non-linguistic
meanings are developed. What Cassirer is talking about in the above
quoted passage might be thought of as seeing a similarity between two
such non-linguistic meanings. When some similarity is perceived between
two situations, thought changes through this experience from an experi
ence of "it” to something about an "it.” let this new meaning would be
lost if it were not given permanence through the act of giving it a name.
Each name-symbol thus formed is a schema, a principle for organizing simi
lar experiences. The essence of symbolism is the use of names to desig
nate perceived meanings created through an interaction with the world,
leaning arises through interaction, and, once the interaction is over,
all that is left is the meaning, preserved if fixated through time by a
name. From this it follows that the meaning named, no more than the now
irretrievably past interaction, is to be found in the world.
Perhaps we can better see what is happening in terms of an example
which seems compatible with Cassirer’s position, and seems also to contain
at least some of the essentials of his thoughts on the subject.

Let us

suppose then, that we are in the presence of primitive tool-using man. At
the stage of language development with which we are concerned, man has
learned to designate certain of his tools by name. What would be the
^Cassirer, Philosophy. 283-284.

^Ibid.. 280.

-19meanimg of the name for the tool to its user? Cassirer emphasizes the
fact that, to the primitive mind, things are thought of in terms of their
use, i.e., in terms of their utilitarian, functional properties.

And, as

Church has pointed out, to the child of today even, a car is first "something that you ride in.”17 Thus, we might suppose that if the tool were
used as a hammer its name would mean something like "the thing I hit with"
or "the thing I beat with," etc.

Similarly, if the tool were used as a

scraper, its name would mean something to the effect of "the thing that
I scrape with.”
Suppose now that some man loses one of his tools or that one is
broken and he decides to replace it.

Should he now produce a tool like

the first one in its functional properties and give it the nan® of the
old tool, we would have something of the essence of symbolisms a name that
has been transferred from one concrete, particular situation to another.
The name, formerly meaningful in only one situation, has been carried
over and applied to another situation.

low suppose that the name for

this tool becomes with time applied to other tools that are like it in
some of its functional properties, those that have been perceived to be
relevant in using its name.

The name would then stand for what we are

free to think of as the class of such tools, and its meaning would be in
terms of some common functional property of those tools.
What has been suggested through the above example is that symbolic
meanings develop in terms of some noted characteristic of many particular
situations.

Their application in any particular situation henceforth be

comes a designation of some instance of
^Church, 173.

sob®

class of situations.

It is

-20the "designational" quality of the application of symbolic meaning which
is referred to as asserting that symbols allow us to talk about the world.
There is an underlying assumption running throughout the discussion
thus far which it might be well to make explicit.

This assumption is that

men have not only similar experiences of the world but that they also have
similar insights concerning their experiences.

In no other way could the

above account claim to be an explanation of the genesis of shared mean
ings.

That is, for the resulting symbolic meanings to be shared ones,

there must have been a sameness in the sensed similarities between situa
tions on the part of the individuals involved. The designational quality
of symbols, when used, entails the assumption of referring to' meanings
which arose through previously shared insights.
One further point should perhaps be made, in the example given
above the transfer of meanings was made in terms of use.

However, it is

certainly possible to see that other transfers of meaning in terms of
some property of situations but not in terms of use of things are also
possible.

The important transfer, or maybe more correctly, the essence

of the transfer is that of created meaning.
Turning now to a discussion of concepts, it can be seen that, from
the very beginning, the symbol has something of;the nature of a concept.
Symbols designate, initially, a sensed similarity in the experiences of
two or more situations while concepts group together symbolic meanings
as subordinate members of a class in terms of some shared characteristic
of meaning.

Thus to distinguish symbols from concepts seems more a mat

ter of degree than of kind.

Looked at from another angle, concepts are

expressed in symbols; we invent a new symbol to stand for a concept. let

-21there are reasons for keeping both terms and in attempting to, in some
measure,differentiate between them,

itt the same time, we should recog

nize that it is only a verbal shorthand to speak of concepts rather than
of symbols as concepts.
That the formation of concepts is an almost identical process to
that of the formation of symbols is made clear by Cassirer in showing
that the process cannot be accounted for solely in terms of abstraction.
The process of abstraction can only be carried out with re
spect to such contents as have already been defined and desig
nated, which have been classified in language and thought. But
how, we must now ask, do we arrive at this classification it
self? What are the conditions of that first primary formation
which is effected in language and which provides the foundation
for all subsequent and more complex syntheses of logical thought?
. . . To penetrate to the ultimate source of the concept, our
thinking . . . must seek those factors of synthesis and analysis
which are at work in the process of word formation itself, and
which are decisive for the ordering of all our representations
according to specific linguistic classifications.
In Cassirer*s view, the formation of a concept begins with the ap
prehension of a particular common property of symbolic meanings.
Before language can proceed to the generalizing and subsuming
form of the concept, it requires another, purely qualifying;
type of concept formation. Here a thing is named not from the
genus to which it belongs, but on the basis of some particular property which is apprehended in the total intuitive con
tent.
From the above it can be seen that a concept is not simply abstracted
meaning; the concept is in none of the particular symbolic meanings from
which it is supposedly taken. As Cassirer says,
If, after having fixed and named several contents as such, we
group them into the form of a series, we seem, in so doing, to
have postulated a common characteristic which is manifested in
all of them, yet in each one with a specific d i f f e r e n c e . 2 0
^Cassirer, Philosophy. 280.

~^Ibid.. 283.

^QIbid.. 282

-22There is in Cassirer’s account an assertion to the effect that sym
bols make human, symbolic thought possible. We might pause new to examine
that assertion more closely.

It isgnot the trivial point that, without
i

symbols, thought would not be "symbolic" in nature.

The use of symbols

provides not only the nature of human thought, but, in Cassirer’s view,
is essential to the fact that man is able to reflect on aspects of form
and meaning as we are wont to do.

Reflection requires the ability to

isolate ideas, relations, or concepts for concentrated attention. For
this, it is necessary that such ideas be separable from the mere stream
of consciousness. This problem is characterized by Cassirer as follows:
All consciousness appears to us in the form of a temporal pro
cess— but in the course of this process certain types of "form”
tend to detach themselves. The factor of constant change and
the factor of duration tend to merge.21
The linguistic forms (e.g., conceptual frameworks) which man creats
"as products of language, myth and art, and in the intellectual symbols of
science"22 seem to have a sort of existence in the mind independently of
their being referred to by consciousness at any particular moment.
is our experience of them.

This

let, as Cassirer says, "At the same time in

order to be manifiested, to exist ’for us*’ they mast be represented in
this stream."23 The problem is that linguistic formulations as products
of thought must be referrable to by thought, i.e., brought into the temp
oral stream of consciousness— this is the character of symbolic reflection.
Cassirer asserts that, "In the creation and application of the various
groups and systems of symbolic signs, both conditions are fulfilled."2^
His meaning seems to be that linguistic formulations, as products of man’s
21Ibid.. 110.

22Ibid.

23Ibid.

24Ibid.

-23thought, have the character of being "referable to" by virtue of the fact
that they were in the first place constructed in terms of symbolic mean
ings free in their meaningfulness from any particular external reality.
They are representable in the stream of consciousness by virtue of this
same fact, i.e., their meaning does not depend on anything in the stream
of consciousness.

The meaning of "refer to" in this caseois the fact that

their meaning has been previously created and can now be drawn upon. When
a conceptual thought is represented in the stream of consciousness, atten
tion is focused on these previously constructed meanings.

Of course, it

should be noted that this is only a description of how it seems to work
in Cassirer*s view, not an explanation of consciousness.
With the attainment of the ability to reflect symbolically about
the

world, nanstarted on a path leading to ever greater sophistication

in his conceptions of the world.

It is with these symbolic meanings, or

primitive concepts, which finally emerge as culturally evolved formula
tions of things that man* s understanding of the world has been built.

If

our own understanding of the world is more complex and comprehensive than
would seem to be provided by such a process of attained meaning as that
suggested above, it is because our language has culturally evolved to
higher levels of abstraction and categorization of our expreience of the
world, and the power of our language in its availability to use in symboli
cally structuring an understanding of that experience has gained accord
ingly.

In speaking of this increasing power of language, Cassirer says,

The ascent to higher levels of abstraction, to more general
and comprehensive names and ideas, is a difficult and labori
ous task . . . . Human speech evolves from a first compara
tively concrete state to an abstract state . . . . In many
languages we find an abundance of color names. Each individ
ual shade of a given color has its special name . . . . The

-24same holds good for the category of number: Different num
erals are required for referring to different classes of ob
jects. The ascent to universal concepts and categories,
therefore, appears to be very slow in the development of hu
man speech; but a new advance in this direction leads to a
more comprehensive survey, to a~better orientation and organi
zation of our perceptual world.
The power of man*s thought then., lies not in his explicitness of
language except in a very special sense; for the adequacy of a descrip
tion to be accepted it must be explicit. Yet it seems even more impor
tant, when we are dealing with a subject of considerable complexity,
that our description be given at a level of abstraction sufficiently
high to allow use of comprehensive terms which include details without
particular reference to any but the most prominent of them.

Otherwise,

we have no comprehensible description but a mass of incomprehensible
details.

Human meaning, symbolic meaning is not one of details, but

rather one which is applied and within which details fit.

This is what

Church and Cassirer mean by a symbolic, and, on higher levels of ab
straction, conceptual structuring of an individual?s world.
The nature of the symbols man uses, their freedom from any par
ticular external world of experience, allows man the freedom to sym
bolically restructure, shift and see things differently.

And this, in

the writer1s understanding of Cassirer, is his view of what symbolic
thinking is. The problem solving process found in the higher animals,
and learning, apparently available to all animal life, gains freedom
and power almost beyond comprehension in man alone when symbols sub
stitute for, and allow the individual to create new, symbolically struc
tured conceptions of the world and its possibilities.
25cassirer, Essay. 135-136.
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Having reached a stage in our discussion where we are talking
about conceptual creativity, attention can now be turned to the use of
this capacity in creating conceptual frameworks.

In discussing the case

of Helen Keller, Cassirer is attacking "associationist" explanations of
such things as perception and symbolic functioning. At this point,
Cassirer asserts that,
If the sensationalist theories of perception were right, If
every idea were nothing but a faint copy of an original sense
impression, then the condition of a blind, deaf and dumb
child would indeed be desperate. For it would be deprived
of the very sources of human knowledge; it would be, as it
were, an exile from reality. But . . . . as the case of
Helen Keller proves, man can construct his symbolic world
out of the poorest and scantiest of materials.
At this point Cassirer states his own position on the role of symbols
in the creation of human worlds of thought:
The thing of vital importance is not the individual bricks
and stones but their general function as architectural form.
In the realm of speech it is their general symbolic function
which vivifies the material signs and "makes them speak."
Without this vivifying principle the human world would in
deed remain deaf and mute. With this principle, even the
world of a deaf, blind and dumb child can become, incompar
ably broader and richer than the world of the most highly
developed animal. '
A definition of conceptual frameworks can now be given as a
created "way of seeing things" that is structured in terms pf symbolic
meanings.

It is a relational way of placing meanings in a certain con

figuration that is meaningful in and of itself. Another way of putting
the point would be to say that the meanings used in such conceptual
structures take their preciseness of meaning either wholly or in part
26Ibid.. 35-36.
2?Ibid

-26from the context in which they appear.

Symbolic meanings in context

form a whole which is greater than and is not simply the sum of its
individual meanings.
In the next chapter we will attempt to see something of the use
of conceptual structuring on the part of scientists in making a dis
covery. Following this a similar search will be made in one type of
human problem solving— that kind which could be presumed to be aided
by a knowledge of relevant concepts. We will then return to the sub
ject of the general function of conceptually structured formulations
of things in making possible what Cassirer has referred to as “the
human world of space and time.”

CHAPTER THREE
TIE USE OF SYMBOLIC RESTRUCTURING IN
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
Science is thought of by many as the systematic discovering of
orderliness in nature.

As Cohen and Nagel point out in discussing

Mill’s canons of discovery, the oft-made claim that experimental methods
are capable of leading to the demonstration with complete certainty of
universal, invariant relations has long been regarded as resting on
the assumption that nature is uniform.-*- Yet to emphasize the "lawful
ness" of nature without at the same time considering the creative con
tribution of the scientist in discovering that lawfulness is perhaps
to miss something vital to an understanding of the nature of scientific
enquiry.

In the following discussions of scientific discovery, Stephen

Toulmin and Ernst Cassirer take pains to emphasize the conceptual
creativity on the part of the scientist in discovering what lawfulness
is to be found in nature.

In a later discussion by David Hawkins, not

only the conceptual creativity of the scientist but also the orderliness
of nature is explored.

Hawkins puts forward the interesting thesis

that our knowledge of nature might be the result of some kind of
^Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and
Scientific Method (New Yorkt larcourt Brace and Co., 1934), 26?ff.
-27-

-28interaction between our investigation of nature on the one hand, and
the order in nature on* the other.
Discovery in Science as Sew Ways of Regarding Old Phenomena
What does it mean to say that a scientist has made a "discovery”
of some lawfulness in nature? Was "it" there unbeknownst to us until
he stumbled across it? What does such a "discovery** amount to really?
Stephen Toulmin has suggested that we should not only ask these questions,
but also what "sort of demonstration will justify us in agreeing that,
whereas this was not previously known, it now can be regarded as
known."2 Toulmin*s point is that scientific discovery ought not to
be confused with the kind of discovery that takes place when an explorer
discovers a new river or a botanist discovers a new variety of flower;
what the scientist actually discovers is a new way of regarding already
familiar phenomena.
Toulmin goes to considerable length to present his argument as
fully as possible.

In the following brief synopsis covering only the

main lines of the argument, no attempt is made to argue for the correct
ness of his views. They are presented as an at least plausible account
and one fitting science as it has come within the range of the writer*s
experience.
Toulmin asks that we consider the possible formulation of the
scientific hypothesis to the effect that light travels in straight
lines, or the principle of the rectilinear propagation of light, as it
SToulmin, Philosophy of Science. 1? ff.

-29is known in the field of geometrical optics. As might be expected,
Toulmin directs our attention first to the phenomena to be accounted
for:

shadows, changes in the distribution of light and shade as the

sun moves or as we move a lamp, changes in the size of shadows depend
ing (or seeming to depend) on the distance the shadow-producing object
is from the lamp, and so on.
low, as before the introduction of the idea of light traveling
in straight lines, it certainly would have meant little to speak of
light as traveling. As Toulmin goes to some pains to make clear, both
of the key words, "light” and "traveling,” in the discovery are given
new uses in the very statement of that discovery.

Prior to the adoption

of the notion of light traveling in straight lines, the phenomena it
explains remain things primitive, simply to be accepted as "the way
things are."

In Church*s system, they are physiognomically perceived.

After the discovery the phenomena become something "explained;" they
are part of a symbolically structured interpretation of experience,
low they are the effects of something hitherto never referred to as
"light."
The "light" now referred to is clearly not the sun or a lanp or
illuminated areas; rather, it is something inferred from them and such
phenomena as changes in shadows. This something to which we have given
the label "light" is to be thought of as something that is traveling,
but again the notion of traveling has been extended by the scientist
in stating his discovery.

In the sort of situations with which the

physicist is concerned, it ought to strike us as odd to speak of any
thing as traveling in the usual sense of the word.

The physicist

-30talks of light traveling whether shadows or light patches are moving
or stationary. As Toulmin says,
The discovery that light travels in straight lines was not,
therefore, the discovery that, where previously nothing had
been thought to be, in any ordinary sense, traveling, there
turned out on closer inspection to be something traveling—
namely, light: to interpret the optical statement in this
way would be to misunderstand its whole point.3
What the physicist has done, Toulmin argues, is to take the notions,
the concepts of "light" and "traveling” and use them to provide a new
way of regarding familiar phenomena.
What justifies us in looking at familiar phenomena in a new way
is to be determined in terms of the adequacy of, first, how well our
new way of seeing things can be made to account for the facts— i.e.,
provides an "understanding of why they are as they are."^- Secondly,
it is to be found in new questions it prompts us to ask, questions
which formerly would not have occurred to us to ask.

Toulmin says:

Coming to think about shadows and light-patches in a new way,
and in consequence to ask new questions about them, questions
like "Where from?," "Where to?" and "How fast?," which are
intelligible only if,one thinks of the phenomena in this new
way.-’
All of these questions, it should be noted, can be asked without ever
troubling with the question of what it is that is traveling.
Finally, Toulmin cautions against thinking of scientific dis
coveries as simply summing up or stating more compactly a series of ob
servations; a scientific discovery is not "a plain generalization of
^Ibid., 20.

%bid., 29.
^Ibid.. 21.

-31the observations we write down in our laboratory notebooks.”^ The dis
covery has the nature of inventing a conceptual formulation of things
within which observations may be fitted and thereby e^qjlained.'7
Discovery in Science as Symbolic Restructuring
The views of Toulmin find ready support in the philosophical
work of Cassirer. What Toulmin has termed finding new ways of regard
ing old phenomena, Cassirer refers to as symbolic restructuring.

Both

accounts involve the creation of a conceptual framework for seeing the
’’facts*' of the world in a new way. As Cassirer puts it,
All systems of classification are artificial. Mature as
such only contains individual and diversified phenomena. If
we subsume these phenomena under class concepts and general
laws we do not describe facts of nature. Every system is a
work of art— a result of conscious creative activity.®
Cassirer, like Toulmin, points to the fallacy of regarding scien
tific discoveries as depending in any simple way upon accurate observa
tions.

In speaking of the emergence of chemistry from alchemy he writes,

It was by no means the lack of empirical evidence that for
many centuries obstructed the progress of chemical thought
and kept chemistry within the bounds of pre-scientific con
cepts. If we study the history of alchemy we find that the
alchemists possessed an astounding talent for observation.
They amassed a great bulk of valuable facts, a raw material
without which chemistry could scarcely have been developed.
But the form in which this material was presented was quite
inadequate. When the alchemist began to describe his obser
vations he had no instrument at his disposal but a half-mythi
cal language, full of obscure and ill-defined terms. le
spoke in metaphors and allegories, not in scientific concepts.'
6Ibid.. 64.
7Ibid.
8
Cassirer, Essay. 209.
9Ibid.. 215.

-32For both Toulmin and Cassirer the process of scientific discovery
calls for creativity on the part of the discovering scientist. It is
not the mere apprehending of facts that leads todiscover, but the cast
ing of them into a form that is understandable.

In Cassirer1s words,

For this decisive step which leads from the merely apprehendable to the understandable we are always in need of a new
instrument of thought. We must refer our observations to a
system of well-ordered symbols in order to make them coher
ent and interpretable in terms of scientific concepts.10
It is the creation of such ’’well-ordered symbols” which is symbolic re
structuring} it is the result of such symbolic restructuring that is a
discovery.
Discovery in Terms of Evolving Categories of Thought
It was the view of Kant that the human mind is possessed of cer
tain categories of thought; i.e., ways of organizing the world of sense
into knowledge.

According to Kant the human mind imposes on received

sense data the a priori categories of substance (i.e., permanent things
with qualities), causality, magnitude and so on. The philosopher David
Hawkins, while agreeing with much that Kant had to say, takes issue
with his view that these categories are ”mind-dependent and fixed, once
and for all.”^

Hawkins insists that we must regard man as a being who

has evolved in this world, one who has learned and is capable of con
tinuing to learn from this world.

For Hawkins, then, the categories of

Kant are not fixed; they have changed and will continue to change with
man’s increasing knowledge of and changing views of the world.
1QIbid.. 217.
^Hawkins, The language of Mature. 254.

-33The argument presented by Hawkins is a rather complex and in
volved one since it is given in terms of a fusion of views from thermo
dynamics and information theory.

The results of that argument, however,

are very similar to the views of Toulmin and Cassirer already presented
— at least insofar as they apply to the subject of discovery in science.
In Hawkins' words, "What we call science is constructed and tested out
of human experience.

But it is constructed, it is an artifact; its

mode of construction is human, and it bears the mark of style."12
According to Hawkins, there is a certain necessary correspondence
or relationship between man's perceiving mind and the world.

With this

thought, of course, we come to the view that there is order in the
world, but still do not take seience as the passive recording of order
in the world.

Hawkins greatly emphasizes the fact that the human mind

is both greatly complex and highly structured and that part of the
mind's function is to act as an information processing center. From
one side of the question of older, the perceiving of order is a result
of and made possible by a highly structured and ordering mind.

However,

Hawkins argues against the idea that sensory input from the world
"can, in any intelligible sense, be said to receive form solely from
some synthetic capacity of intuition in accordance with a priori organizing p r i n c i p l e13s F o r one thing, there must be order in the world
because "the only sensory input that is formless is sheer random noise,
12
'Ibid.. 252.
13Ibid.
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and with sack input nothing is
The position of Hawkins

14
perceived at all.” ^

might appear to conflict

with theearlier

formulations of Cassirer and Toulmin to the effect that the discovering
of order in nature is, in Cassirer*s words, ”a result of conscious
creative activity.” However, closer inspection reveals that these
positions are not at variance at all. 411 three writers recognize
that our experience of the world is not random in character. But where
Toulmin and Cassirer have emphasized the creative contribution of the
scientist in formulating a conception of that order, Hawkins, for pur
poses ©f his own, is emphasizing the orderliness in nature by which
the scientist is guided. Man, Hawkins asserts, is an organized perceiver who has evolved in an organized world and who makes sense of
that world because his categories of thought as well as his means of
perceptually receiving information from the world have an evolutionary
history.

But this is an argument that will be

To appreciate something

developed in whatfollows.

of the force of Hawkins’

must consider what he calls a third stage in evolution.

argument,we
This develop

ment bears a striking similarity to what Cassirer speaks of as man’s
acquisition of a new, symbolic link and a new dimension of reality.
However, where Cassirer is concerned with accounting for the develop
ment of a symbolic dimension of consciousness, Hawkins’ main program
is to find a link between this symbolic dimension and current knowledge
of physiology.

He finds this link in the notion of information theory.

Hawkins outlines three stages of evolution.

In all three he is

concerned with an informative interaction between organism and environment
■^Ibid., 254.

-35and the transfer of this information to succeeding generations of the or
ganism. At the first stage of evolution delineated there can be only gen
etic transmission of any informative interaction between organism and en
vironment, and this is small indeed in any one generation.

There is no

learning at this stage. The biochemical mechanisms of the responsiveness
of the organism to its environment is encoded in the genetic record and
passed on, but "if the species learns, it does so only by becoming a new
species."^
Such organisms are suited to live only in simple surroundings where
food is abundant, but what of the organism forced to live in a complex and
variable environment? The genetic record, already tremendously complex,
can only be extended so far; at some point it can no longer be extended.
At some point in the distant past a learning component evolved as an addi
tion to the organism’s makeup, and this, in Hawkins’ account, marks the
second stage in evolution.

However, the information gained by the organ

ism’s interaction with the environment is not genetically transmitted and
dies with the organism. Even when some of the information needed for liv
ing is incorporated into the environment, as in bee hives, this limitation
remains unremoved.
In the ancestory of man, however, Hawkins asserts that this
upper bound has ceased to be effective.

"The third stage of evolution

is marked, within a single genus, by the appearance of a new mode of
evolution, non-biological and more rapid by orders of magnitude than
the biological mode." ® This new mode of evolution, linguistically
15Ibid.. 271.

l6Ibid.. 276.

-36mediated, cultural evolution, is manifested both externally and intermally. 17 Man not only lives in his environment, he remakes it and con
trols it.

He is able to do this because he has a linguistically medi

ated understanding of both himself and of his place in the world as
well as of the world itself.

The internal side of cultural advance is

the creation and sophistication of a human world of symbolically struc
tured experience.

Hence, we find in Hawkins* account the thesis of

Cassirer; namely, that the individuals comprehension of the world and
the people about him, and of himself, is a linguistic process of sym
bolic structuring.
We are now ready to return to our discussion of the process of
scientific discover, for, in Hawkins* view, one of the things evolved
and culturally transmitted through culture is the world view of that
culture; within it and basic to it are its categories of thought.

The

categories of thought are a cultural achievement evolved out of a re
finement of analogies.

The refinement of analogies might be compared

to a refinement of tools. As Hawkins at one point sayss
There is a continuity in the development of knowledge,just
as the tools we make are limited by the tools we already
have, the tools to make them with. In neither case can we
make arbitrary innovations, and in neither case are limited
to a mere replication of what we already have.l®
At this point we can see a very close correspondence between the thoughts
of Hawkins and Cassirer if we view analogies as symbolic structures and
17'Hawkins* terms for the above aspects of cultural evolution are
the "extemalization" and "internalization" of culture.
^Hawkins, 245*

-37the refinement of analogies as symbolic restructuring.
Hawkins stresses the fact that the categories, as ways of organ
izing experience, have a long history, a cultural, evolutionary history,
and that, as such, they reflect the cumulative effects of the interaction
between man’s culture and the world.

There is a necessary correspondence

between man’s ways of regarding the world and the world itself— although
not a necessary knowledge of the world.

Han’s analogies are couched in

a sort of ”language of nature.” By this Hawkins means that we have
”these categories of knowledge and not others because these facilitate
flows of information as others would not; we evolve the channels to fit
19
the signal source, of nature.”
it the risk of oversimplifying things, it would seem that what
Hawkins is saying could be boiled down to a conception of the scientist
as limited by the conceptual tools he brings to an investigation of
nature, ©n the one hand, and the ”facts” of nature on the other.

Hawkins’

regard of this state of affairs is an optimistic on© because the former
limitation is subject to cultural development and sophistication.

In

Hawkins’ view then, the process of scientific discovery is one involving
the refinement of analogies whose use results in statements which more
and more closely approximate true statements about the world

19Ibid.. 254.

CIAPTEE FOUE
A FUETHEB CONSIDERATION OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
IN TEEMS OF SI1BOLIC EESTEUCTUBING
It will be recalled that Cassirer puts forward the thesis that man
has gained the ability to think about the world and apply conceptual
frameworks to the world through the development of an abstract symbol
system, i.e., language.

There must be an intermediary stage in which

there occurs the symbolization of experience before human, symbolic
thought can take place.

Yet, once this symbolization of experience is

underway, the meaning of terms man uses does not depend on concrete sense
data, i.e., the '’sensible” world need not be present to be referred to.
Man is free in his thought processes from any concrete, particular extern
al reality.

Symbolic meaning is a created structure of man’s mind trans

mitted through language, and it is entirely in terms of such meanings
that the understanding of the world which is uniquely man’s is structured.^"
Cassirer* s contention is that what distinguishes human thought is
that man has developed and has exclusively available to use by his con
sciousness a symbolic environment, with it an ability to think symboli^"Cassirer* s emphasis upon the symbolic nature of man’s thought
might seem excessive unless it is remembered that his treatment of the
subject is one that excludes physiognomic pereetion as part of man’s view
of the world. In other words, Cassirer is concerned with contemplative,
judgmental and analytic thought which, as was noted in Church’s discussion,
indicates the cessation of physiognomic perception.
-38-

-39cally about the world, and finally to conceptualize the world symbolical
ly and thus understand: it. We are therefore free, within the framework
of Cassirer1a account, to differentiate between a symbolically concept
ualized understanding of the world which is man*s alone and other, nonsymbolically structured understandings— attainable by at least the higher
animals.

In this chapter we shall be looking for those features of ©mr

own, uniquely human understanding distinctive from the rest of the animal
world.
We might begin by postulating a structured awareness of the world
in all of animal life, in the higher animals, a consciousness which is
the result of mental activity.

In man, through his use of the symbol,

this activity has become something more.

Beginning with the assumption

of an active, consciousness in man, we might turn to questions concern
ing the possible activities of the mind.

How is it active? What does it

"do"?
For one thing, we now can be fairly certain that it does more than
simply combine elements by "association.” In discussing the possible
combining of elements of consciousness, Cassirer points out that the con
cept of association is "broad enough to cover all relations that could
possibly exist in consciousness; but by its very breadth it obscures their
2
specific character." As he goes on to say,
Association fails to distinguish between relations of the most
diverse quality and modality. "Association" means the fusion
of elements into the unity of the ego or the object, into the
whole of a thing or a sequence of events— into a series whose
members are connected by the criterion of cause and effect and
into a series whose members are connected by the criterion of
"means” and "ends."3
%assirer, Philosophy, 102.

^Ibid.

-40Cassirer’s point is that by failing to take into account the system of fun
ctions which consciousness achieves, "the diversity of paths by which con
sciousness arrives at its synthesis is totally obscurred."^ At the same
time it gives the character of consciousness as that of a passive perceiver of the world.

In his view the mind is constantly engaged in the

structuring of information sensorially received from the environment and
in seeking more information from that environment.

In Churchfs system,

the above activity is what he refers to as schematization.
In Cassirer’s discussion of relational thought, he begins by mak
ing the point that the awareness of relations is not restricted to humans;
animals have been trained in ehoiee situations and show a great ability in
choosing among objects on the basis of the correct choice being nearer
than, darker than, larger than, and so forth. The difference between ani
mals and men in problem solving, he states, is that the animal is tied to
particular situations wherein he can solve the problem in terms of things
present; man, however, is not so limited to things concrete and present.**
His examination of the evidence leads Cassirer to assert that "high
er animals are capable of that process which Hume in his theory of knowl
edge terms making a ’distinction of reason.’" Yet he goes on to say:
But all the experimenters engaged in these investigations have
also emphasized the rarity, the rudimentariness and the imper
fection of these processes . . . . If there are certain traces
of a distintio rationis in the animal world, they are, as it
were, nipped in the bud. They cannot develop because they do
not possess that invaluable and indeed indispensable aid of
human speech, of a system of symbols.®
Man shares with the higher animals then, his creative, active comseiousiousness, but, through a greater capacity or something we might loosely
fofbid.. 103.

^Cassirer, Essay. 38-39*

^Ibid.

term intelligence, he has gained the use of a tool of thought beyond the
reach of the rest of the animal world. The symbol, as Cassirer has as
serted is the key to the understanding of man, for it is the use of the
symbol that has freed man*s consciousness from things experienced dir
ectly.

The relational thought of nan requires a complex system of sym

bols wherein relations can be structured and considered in themselves.
We do find in man a special type of relational thought which
has no parallel inthe animal world. In man an ability to
isolate relations--to consider them in their abstract meaning
has developed. In order to grasp this meaning man is no long
er dependent on concrete sense data, upon visual, tactile, kin
esthetic data. He considers these relations ’’in themselves*’1?
From Cassirer’s account, it would appear that the distinctive
features of human thought and understanding that we seek are to be found
in the fact that man possesses the tool of conceptual thought which al
lows him to consider a problem in its abstract relational aspects.

In

Church’s system, the schema is made explicit through being treated symbol
ically.

Or, to refer back to the previous discussion of scientific dis

covery, it can be seen that reaching such a discovery involves something
more than can be accounted for in terms of perceptual acuity— i.e., in
terms of astute observation of the facts as presented visually.

The

scientist’s solution involves the structuring of phenomena into a new
form, a working conceptualization which can then be applied back to the
observational '’facts’1 to see whether they are accounted for or not in
terms of this new formulation of things.

The power of man’s thought de

pends upon the power of the conceptual tools he can bring to the task and
these in turn are dependent on cultural advance in sophisticating language
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Symbolic Versus Perceptual Problem Solving
Some of the contentions that have been raised thus far in the pre
sent discussion of human understanding will be both clarified and support
ed through a discussion of human, conceptual problem solving.

However, to

provide some needed contrasts between animal and human problem solving,
some discussion of the problem solving efforts of animals will also be in
cluded.

Comprehension of the presently advocated view of human understand

ing almost necessitates distinguishing it from animal"understanding.

To

that end the efforts of the present section are bent.
Kohler1s studies of insightful problem solving in chimpanzees pro
vide excellent material for the discussion of animal problem solving.
When properly considered we can see in them some of the points of Cassirer* s
just recounted discussion of relational thought.

In Kohler’s studies, it

is possible to see the seeking of new relationships within the visual
field as the source of insight.
In his discussion of insightful solutions Kohler seems to imply,
that, when confronted with a problem solvable through~a rearrangement of
objects, prior to such actual rearranging there occurred a perceptual re
structuring of the situation.

In the single box problem, for example, a

lure was hung out of reach with a box present but not under the lure. All
of the animals tested made repeated attempts to reach the lure by jumping,
even jumping from the box in its unmoved position.

However, Sultan, whom

Kohler came to regard as most intelligent of the group, soon ceased jump
ing, paced up and down, and suddenly stood in front of the box.

Then,

moving it quickly beneath the lure, he mounted It, jumped, and secured

-43the Imre.
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The contention the writer wishes to assert here is that before

moving the box beneath the Imre, i.e., prior to actually rearranging the
physical environment, Sultan shifted his regard of his perceptual field.
He ’’saw” the box beneath the lure and what such a positioning of it would
result in with regard to his attempts to reach the lure. This perceptual
restructuring (or what Kohler and others have termed a ’’Gestalt”), the
writer is arguing, was his insight.

let we should not stop here but go

on to notice that his insight was one that penetrated the nature of the
problem he faced and was a solution of the problem.

Dare we dignify his

regard of the unmoved box, his, as has been argued, "seeing” it beneath
the lure with the term "hypothesis"? Possibly we can, for we have in
Sultan’s insightful solution of the box problem all of the elements of
scientific discovery save one, symbolic restructuring or manipulation in
terms of relevant concepts.

The necessary tie-in with the previous dis

cussion of scientific discovery lies in the fact that his insight amount
ed to an understanding of the problem situation.

It was a general, rudi

mentary type of understanding, and a non-symbolic one to be sure, but an
understanding nevertheless. 9
laving in some measure accounted for an animal’s understanding of
a problem situation in terms of non-symbolic relational thought or per
ceptual restructuring, let us turn to some analogous studies in human
%. Kohler, "The Mentality of Apes," following Woodworth and
Schlosberg’s discussion in "Problem Solving and Thinking,” Experimental
Psychology.(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1954), 820.
% t might be argued that there is no reason to insist that Sultan’s
understanding was a non-symbolic one. However, the point is that concept
ual thinking need not be invoked to explain his insightful behavior. As
the following discussion endeavors to show, this is not the case with re
gard to human understanding.

-44problem solving.

Because investigators have long been aware of the im

portance of concepts to the processes of human problem solving, problems
have been devised whose solutions entail the use of some widely held con
cept.

In Kaier*s two-string problem, for example, the needed concept is

that of the pendulum.10 The subject is introduced into a room,bare except
for two strings hanging from the ceiling, a chair, a piece of wire, and a
pair of pliers.

The solution involving the use of the concept of the

pendulum is for the subject to tie the pliers to one of the strings and
set it swinging— i.e., make a pendulum out of it, then, holding the other
string, grasp the swinging pendulum at its nearest point.

The problem is

made more difficult by the fact that a wire is present and pliers are gen
erally regarded as a tool used on wire.

The concept "tool," reinforced

by the wire, is in the way of the concept "weight" which in turn can only
be seen as relevant in terms of the concept "pendulum." A conceptual
solution requires that, in accordance with the concept "pendulum," the
concept "tool" be replaced by the concept "weight." When the problem is
solved as above, then we have what we can truly identify as a symbolic
restructuring of the situation into one in which one of the strings is
seen as a potential pendulum and the pliers are seen, not as a tool, but
as a weight for it.
Mow let us return to our discussion of the distinction between per
ceptual restructuring and symbolic restructuring.

Suitan?s solution to

the box problem required a restructuring of the perceptual field. .The
10N.R.F. Haier, "Reasoning in Humans, II," following C.E. Gsgood»s
discussion in "Problem Solving and Insight," Method and Theory of Experi
mental Psychology (New York5 Oxford University Press, 1953), 632-633-
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not only a restructuring of the perceptual field, but its restructuring
in terms of a known concept previously not seen as relevant to the situa
tion.

To use Toulmin*s formulation, the "notion*1 of the pendulum must be

applied to this particular situation. Again, the elements of an attained
understanding are before us, but new, uniquely human elements have been
added: the combination of perceptual and symbolic elements (i.e., concepts)
into a new kind of understanding, a symbolically structured, conceptual
way of relating the elements of the problem.
Still let us pause to consider that the above argument for a sym
bolic restructuring is in some ways open to attack. A solution could
have been reached without any symbolic restructuring.

The subjects could

have seen that what was needed was a weighted, swinging string and also
seen the pliers as a means of achieving this without ever even possessing
the concept of the pendulum.

Their solutions would then have been like

Sultan*s solution to the box problem in every respect. As John B. Carroll
has pointed out, human beings do solve problems without having knowledge
of how a physicist would describe their behavior in terms of scientific
concepts:
The concept of the lever is utilized by the farmer when he
pries up a stone, even though he may not verbalize it with
either the words lever or pry. In such cases it might be
thought that we could dispense with the notion of concept
and assert that the response of the farmer is a direct learn
ed response to a particular kind of problem, namely a stone
which is hard to move, nevertheless the fact that the farmer
may exhibit considerable planful behavior— going to get a
crowbar, digging a socket for it, and finally moving it in a
certain direction— suggests that there is more than a direct,
overt response to the problem situation. .On the other hand,
the fanner might be hard pressed if someone asked him to
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explain how even a not-very-strong child can move, with a
crowbar, a stone ranch heavier than himself.11
As Garroll notes, to dispense with the notion of concepts, it is necessary
to account for the fanner*s "planful behavior."

In this connection, it

should be considered that the farmer* s behavior seems completely analogous
to the behavior of Kohler*s chimpanzees after they had mastered a parti
cular method of solution.

Having learned to use sticks, they would look

for a stick in solving a problem.

Neither the farmer*s nor the chimpan

zee*s behavior is a direct response to the problem situation, but a learn
ed response to a particular kind of problem.

The main difference ip in

the farmer*s greater intelligence, which results in his "knowing" that a
crowbarlis appropriate to the solution to this type of problem, while the
chimpanzees, having learned to use sticks, would try to use them even in
a situation in which their use would be wholly inappropriate.
The point to be emphasized here is that while human beings can and
often do solve problems in terms of what we have termed a perceptually
structured understanding, a symbolic solution to a problem is not of this
nature. To put the point more strongly, to have a concept requires being
able to characterize it symbolically.

This use of concepts, and the un

derstanding it makes possible, is limited to the human species.

Viewed

in this way, it can be seen that the farmer who uses a crowbar as a lever
no more has the concept "lever" than Sultan, in putting two sticks together
to reach a lure has the concept "extension." Such non-symbolic problem
solving behavior seems adequately accounted for in terms of perceptual
structuring and learning without ever invoking concepts.

"Concepts," as

tl.B. Garroll, Language and Thought (Englewood Cliffs, lew Jerseys
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), 84-85.
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It is only in so far

as man has achieved a symbolic conception of problem situations and a sym
bolically structured, conceptual way of relating the elements of problems
that he has succeeded in advancing away from the type of thinking engaged
in by the apes.

For adequate illustration of this latter point however,

we might turn to a more typically human problem, one presented in verbal
terms and solved in symbolic concepts.
A classic experiment by K. Duncker provides a good example in this
instance.

Students were given difficult, technical problems and requested

to think aloud as they solved them.

They were to express even the fool

ish notions that occurred to them, and they could ask any questions they
wished.

In one such problem the subjects were given the problem of rid

ding a patient of an inoperable stomach tumor without damaging any tissue
except that of the tumor. They were further informed that rays were avail
able which destroyed organic tissue at sufficient intensity.

One subject’s

sequence of proposals ran as follows:
(l) Send rays through the esophagus. (2). Desensitize the heal
thy tissue by msans of a chemical injection. (Experimenter:
False analogy; no injection is in question.) (3) Expose the
tumor by operating. (4) One ought to decrease the intensity of
the rays on their way; for example— would this works turn the
rays on at full strength only after the tumor has been reached.
(5) One should swallow something inorganic (which would not al
low passage of rays) to protect the healthy stomach-walls. (Ex
perimenter: It is not merely the stomach-walls which are to be
protected.) (6) Either the rays must enter the body or the tu
mor must come out. Perhaps one could alter the location of the
tumor— but how? Through pressure? no . . . (9) Move the tumor
toward the exterior. (The experimenter repeats the problem and
emphasizes, I?which destroys at sufficient intensity.n) (10) The
Intensity ought to be variable.(Compare 4.) (ll) Adaptation of
the healthy tissues by previous weak application of the rays.
(Experimenter: How could one decrease the intensity of the rays
en route?) (13) Reply: Somehow divert . . . diffuse rays . . .
disperse . . . stop! Send a broad and weak bundle of rays

-48through a lens in such a way that the tumor lies at the
focal point and thus receives intensive radiation. (To
tal duration about half an hour.)
In the above example what was an hypothesis becomes a solution because it
not only reaches the goal (in this case the elimination of the tumor),
but is seen to be a consistent path from what is given to what is required.
In Duncker’s experiment the crucial concept was convergence.

However,

this concept could only be seen as relevant after the subject had fully
considered the concept of the ray with its capacities of doing limited
damage depending on the strength of its application.

Then ways were open

for examination of means of concentrating the strength of the ray at the
point of the tumor and no other, and thence to the utilisation of the con
cept of convergence.
The distinction sought between understandings as perceptually struc
tured insights and symbolically structured ones should now be clear.

In

the former, as Cassirer has argued, there occurs the perceptual restruc
turing of elements in terms of things present— possibly benefitting from
past learning.

In the latter there:" is a reformulation of the problem into

a system of well-ordered concepts that provides a ’’way of seeing” these
elements in a way which meets the requirements of a problem in terms of
its givens.

Such conceptual structures or frameworks are the individual’s

solatium to the problem, but it is his use of such formulations in seeing
the elements of the problem in the needed way which is his understanding.
An important point to be emphasised here is that these latter, uniquely
human understandings are communicable.
15

Han’s symbolic tools, to use

K. Duncker, ”0n Problem-Solving,” following C. Osgood’s discus
sion in . . . Experimental Psychology. 626-627.
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theoretically no limit to the conceptual power man*3 thought is capable
of reaching.

This is because with symbolic thought there has been a con

comitant creation, the ability to communicate abstract thoughts.

Cultur

al advance stems from the creative genius of individuals who build in
their turn upon the creative genius of the individuals who have preceded
them. The communicative nature of symbolic thought lies in the fact that,
to say something is not necessarily to "know it," but to "know something*’
symbolically requires being able to say it. Or, to put the same point in
terms of the Issues as presented by Carroll, the farmer who uses a crow
bar as a lever does not have the concept "lever” unless he is able to dis
cuss his behavior in terms of fulcrums, equal moments, etc. or some sym
bolic equivalents thereof.
At this point and before continuing, it might be well to briefly
recapitulate what has been covered thus far.

Through a discussion of the

process of discovery in science and the processes of one type of human
problem solving, we have pursued the notion that the attained understand
ings in the two cases, i.e., scientific and ordinary human understandings,
are of essentially the same nature, a "way of seeing things.” While striv
ing to express their similarities, however, attention must also be given
to differences in the ways such understandings are held (i.e., used) in
the two cases. As was noted earlier, there is a great deal of difference
in the "level of reality” attributed to what amounts to working formula
tions by scientists on the one hand and people in their everyday lives
on the other. We have already seen in the discussion of scientific dis
covery that the scientist is very sophisticated in his understanding of

-50possible relations between his theories and observational facts.

Part of

the following sections of this chapter will be devoted to making the above
point clearer.
The Relation Between Theory and Fact for the Scientist
To think about the world theoretically is almost by definition not
to confront it directly.

A theoretical approach is just that, a symboli

cally mediated approach to the world, and, in terms of that approach the
world is treated "as if" it conformed to our theoretical formulations of
it. We might say that the role of theories in science is that of a work
ing conceptual framework whieh allows us to orient ourselves within the
activity of investigating nature.

An example provided by Toulmin is use

ful here. For some purposes it is useful to the scientist to think of a
cylinder of hydrogen gas "as if" it were a box of fast-moving billiard
balls. We arie quite right in supposing that the scientist does not really
think that a cylinder of gas is a box of fast-moving billiard balls; he
does not.

It is the relevant properties of the analogy that give its

usage a functional utility.

That is, for purposes of treating the sub

ject he has found it useful to think of the cylinder of gas in this fash
ion.13
Another example of the way the scientists notions are related to
fact is provided by the concept of absolute zero, also discussed by
Toulmin.

As he points out, the presence of an absolute zero of tempera

ture might at first appear as a "strange and ineluctable fact about the
universe;" the point beyond which it is impossible to go.1A However, as
13Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science. 165-167*

~^Ibid.. 129-133*
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The existence, at some point, of an absolute zero of tempera
ture is not a brute fact at all, but a conceptual matter— i.e.,
.a consequence of the way we give meaning to the notion of temp
erature, and put degrees of warmth and cold into relation with
the number series. '
The notion of absolute zero is found to be a logical consequence of the
introduction of the concept of an ideal gas, and with it, an aligning of
numbers in an ideal gas scale of temperature such that numbers below
-273*16° G have no interpretation as temperatures.

The current techno

logical fact that no temperatures lower than the physicist* s "absolute
zero” have been reached might be taken as confirming evidence for the
efficacy of his way of looking at things.

However, the physicist suffers

from no delusions that his concept represents a "brute fact" of nature.
It is probably true that the present line of reasoning could be carried
too far.

Certainly it is true that if the scientist did not in fact at

tribute a great deal of meaningfulness and significance to his theoreti
cal formulations he would quite reasonably feel he was wasting his time.
The confirming evidence of his predictions, for one thing, give him cause
to think that he is making statements, however indirect, about the world
of fact.

The point being made is that he does realize that his statements

are indirect, that he is treating the world in an "as if" fashion.

He is

aware that he is not simply talking about "the way things are." And on
this note let us turn to what correspondes to the scientist*s body of
theories, the person*s everyday understanding of things and events, or,
more generally, simply one* s beliefs.
15Ibid.

l6Ibid.
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Everyday Understanding
As Kenneth Boulding sets forth the nature of everyday understand
ing,^^ it has the character of a psychological system.

It is a composite

of many conceptually structured understandings as they have been discus
sed thus far— though much of it has not been given explicit symbolic form
ulation.

That is, the kind of understanding previously discussed should

be thought of as a portion of an individuals total understanding which
has been given explicit symbolic expression.. To use Church’s terms, con
ceptually structured understandings are symbolically formulated portions
of larger schematic frameworks.
Boulding further elaborates his conception of a person’s total
understanding as an orientation to the world as experienced in terms of
space and time, a system of inter-personal roles, and a knowledge of "how
18

things operate."

Finally, Boulding stresses the fact that everything

in a person’s total understanding is, in varying degrees, valuatively
assessed.
Boulding begins:
As I sit at my desk, I know where I am. I see before me a
window; beyond that some trees; beyond that the red roofs of
the campus of Stanford University; beyond them, the trees and
roof tops which make up the town of Palo Alto. 9
He goes on to develop his spatial understanding of things as containing
a conception of the location of the state of California with relation to
the rest of the United States, of the United States, in turn, with rela17

Boulding, The Image. Boulding’s term for what in these pages is
referred to as the person’s "total understanding** is "the image."
18Ibid.. 5.

19Ibid.. 4.
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The world is visualized as a globe, which,

within another formulation of things, is seen as a tiny speck "circling
around a bright star which is the sun, in company with many other similar
specks, the planets."20
He continues,
I know that I came to California about a year ago, and I am
leaving it in about three weeks. I know that I have lived in
a number of different places at different times. I know that
about ten years ago a great war came to an end, that about
forty years ago another great war came to an end. Certain
dates are meaningful: 1776, 1620, 1066. I have a picture in
my mind of the formation of the earth, of the long history of
geological time, of the brief history of man. The great civil
izations pass before my mental screen. Many of the images are
vague, but Greece follows Crete, Rome follows Assyria.2-*We have traced Boulding!s conception of his own understanding far
enough to gain support for our composite characterization of it.

His

spatial understanding is something composed of many sub-understandings.
In turn, his spatial understanding is but a part of his total understand
ing, his total conception of his "place” in the world.
This composite nature of each of the sub-understandings is perhaps
most clearly illustrated in Boulding*s description of his "place" in time.
Some of the parts of his conception of time have their sources in personal
experience, but the bulk is a culturally transmitted heritage.

The dates

1776, 1620 and 1066 probably gained their meaningfulness through courses
in American and British history.

The conceptions of the "long history of

geological time" and the "brief history of man" could have come from a
course in physical anthropology, while the sequence of Greece following
Crete, etc., could have com from the study of ancient history.
To continue with Boulding*s description of the adult*s world view,
2°Ibid.

' 2lIbid.
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we might not® his first two um^or propositions: a) that behavior depends
on individual understanding, and b) that "the meaning of a message is the
change which it produces" in an individual1s understanding of himself,
things, and events.22 The first conforms to the social psychologist’s
notion that what a man does depends upon how he defines the situation he
is in. The second conformsto the present use of meaning to the effect
that the meaning of a communicated message is the change which it produces
in the psychological system of the receiver.
As

Boulding sets forth the nature of man’s interaction with the

world, there are five things which may happen when a message is received.
It may go right through, i.e.-, it may be ignored; it may change a person’s
conceptions in some well-defined way, as, for example, the oceurance of
an expected event; it may cause a reorganization of the person’s under
standing (Boulding’s example for this is religious conversion); it may
cause an effect of adding to or clarifying some part of his understanding;
and finally, it may cause doubt or uncertainty to be introduced into his
understanding.
All of these possible effects of messages are of interest and all
are, in varying degrees, in conformity with the presently advocated view
of communication as resulting in a reorganization of a person’s psycholog
ical system of understandings.

However, the third and forth effects (i.e.,

reorganizing understanding and adding to or clarifying understanding) are
of particular interest with regard to the present interest in communica
tions for these are particularly amenable to interpretation in terms of
the transfer of understandings via the communication of conceptual
22Ibid.. 6.
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Boulding* s views on the effects of messages is something that

will be returned to and used in a later attempt to fit some of the notions
explored in this and the previous chapters together into a composite view
of the communication process.

Before doing that, however, there are a few

more ideas that will be needed and that are contained in Church’s treat
ment of the adult’s world view.
The Symbolic Processing of Schemata
In this section we will return to Church’s discussion of-:schema
tized experience, at this time concentrating upon his discussion of the
individual’s process of treating these schematized notions of the world
23

symbolically.

Church’s conception of this process is the recasting of

schematized experience into verbal structures that are symbolically under
standable.^
We have noted earlier that thd: child first schematizes space prag
matically in terms of direct experience. What is happening can be thought
of as a process wherein the objects of perception experienced directly
are sorted out and fitted into a perceptually meaningful field of action.
The resulting field of action is a schema. When this schema is symboli
cally processed there is the creation of a symbolic space, ii®., space is
no longer confronted directly but is treated in terms of symbolically con
ceptualized notions of space.
A thought from Cassirer is helpful in distinguishing between space
experienced as a field of action and symbolic, conceptualized space. He
23church’s term for the symbolic treatment of previously schema
tized experience is "thematization.”

^Church, 97.
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river, every rock and shoal and rapid. Yet, if asked to give a symbolic
representation of his knowledge, i.e., a map, he would be completely at a
loss.

It is not that he is not in possession of all of the facts necessary

to the completion of an accurate mapj he simply never has represented these
facts to himself or to anyone else except as a succession of direct experi
ences.

He could sit and tell successively every turn to be expected in

navigating the river so that someone listening to him, who did represent
his space symbolically, could draw a fairly accurate nap from his succes
sive description, but for him it would remain a sequence of direct experi25
!
ences.
Returning to Church* s exposition, the five-year-old has a very
accurate conception of how the house he lives in is constructed, but the
picture he would draw of it would reflect, not how the house is actually
constructed nearly so much as the way he has experienced it.26 With the
acquisition of language and the mastery of this mode of expression, there
comes the concomitant ability to give a symbolic representation of per
ceptually experienced space— in accordance with symbolically learned rules
of representation.
In chruch*s discussion of the symbolic processing of experience,
there is also an element of what Cassirer (and to some extent Hawkins) has
referred to as the development of a symbolic dimension of reality.
In our society, the children of symbol-minded parents quickly
pick up styles of analytical, logical, playful, critical lan
guage and begin the slow and painful but rewarding venture of
working and reworking their experience symbolically until they
25
Cassirer, Essay. 44-46.

9/

°Church, 8.
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ual carries a step further the evolutionary internalization,
of the environment: he internalizes it symbolically and can
carry his experience around with him.'
Church sounds a note very remindful of Cassirer when he writes,
In verbalizing reality, we make explicit the properties of
and the connections between things, properties and connec
tions which were only dynamistically implicit or wholly hid
den. Once language has called our attention . . . to prev
iously latent features of the landscape, they remain perman
ently accessible to us.2®
The discussion by Church of the individuals symbolic treatment of
his implicitly understood, schematically ordered experience into symboli
cally represented, conceptually structured knowledge that is permanently
accessible to consciousness concludes our discussion of what is communi
cated.

In the following chapter, attention will be turned to a discussion

of some notions on the subject of how it might be communicated.

27Ibid.. 10?.

28Ibid.. 107-108

CHAPTER FIVE
THE COMMUNICATION OF CONCEPTUALLY STRUCTURED
UNDERSTANDINGS
It is the purpose of this last chapter to return to and in some
ways expand upon the conception of communication put forward in the intro
duction.

Thus advantage can be taken of insights gained through the pre

ceding discussions of the nature of conceptually structured understand
ings.

It should perhaps be noted before beginning this last discussion

that no pretense is made of answering all of the questions or even of con
sidering all of the problems raised by such an inquiry as has been under
taken in these pages. Full consideration of how understandings as we have
discussed them are communicated would most properly be subject of another
study, perhaps even greater in length than the present one.

In short

then, what follows are some thoughts about the process of communicating
a system of ordered symbolic concepts.
To begin with it might be well to emphasize again a distinction be
tween understandings and conceptual frameworks made in the introduction.
"Understanding” should not be regarded as synonymous with "conceptual
framework” but rather as the use of same.

Thus the message content em

bodies a conceptual framework which the receiver, in comprehending its
structure and the symbolic meaning contents within it, gains the use of
on his own behalf.

The present consideration of the process of communi

cating conceptual understandings then, places special emphasis on the
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activities of the receiver in inferring the other person’s understanding.
Me does this by conpreheading the conceptual framework embodied in the
messages he receives.-*The process as thus far described conforms to a view of communica
tion advanced by Boulding.

Its view of communication is the inferring of

the understandings of the world ”which are possessed by those around us
2
from the messages they transmit to us.” Unfortunately Boulding does not
elaborate upon this conception.

However, taken together with his discus

sion of the possible effects of messages, it is still capable of being
expounded more fully.

One such effeet that was singled out earlier for

later discussion at this time was that of adding to, clarifying, and thus
causing a reorganization of understanding.

The view that communication

can result in a reorganization of a structured understanding conforms
quite well with the view of the process indicated above. What needs to
be added to make it conform completely is to say that it is the utiliza
tion of a conceptual framework which reorganizes understanding.

In both

cases it is possible to say that to the extent that the receiver’s con
ceptions of the world are restructured, or are capable of being restruc
tured, by virtu© of having correctly inferred the understanding of things
held by the transmitter, then, to that extent communication has taken
place.
course this process is aided by the simultaneous communication
of meanings via gestures, inflection, tone, etc., but this aspect of the
process is a subject that has received considerable attention elsewhere
and will not be gone into here.
^Boulding, 1?.

To continue, it might be noted that our discussions of the nature
of understandings has provided some views on the question of how messages
com® to be formulated.

Here the reader is referred to two previous dis

cussions: first to the discussion of problem solving leading up to the
assertion that to understand something symbolically requires being able
to symbolically express it, and second to the discussion of the symbolic
processing of schematized experience by Church.

The point of these dis

cussions might be summed up as follows: the very act of symbolically un
derstanding something entails the formulation of a conceptual framework
which symbolically expresses it.
The above conception of the role which the nature of understand
ings plays in the formation of messages is given explicit expression by
Church.

According to Church, when one person speaks, he verbalizes a

portion of schematic framework.

His verbalizations should therefore be

regarded as both a formulation of his thoughts and as the transmitted
message. A listener, on the other hand, "puts on” the schema of the speak
er, and, in efforts to express its lack of congruence with his own, puts
forward his own verbal formulations with regard to the subject.

One per

son begins to verbalize his attitudes and the other chimes in with his
own elaborations, corrections, objections, or alternative symbolic forma
's
lations of the subject.-'
A further aspect of communication, as Church discusses it, arises
through the fact that symbolically formulated schemata are only portions
of larger schematic formulations, not all of which have been made explicit
through being treated symbolically.
^Church, 129-131.

If the subject is one not previously
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thought out by the speaker, large parts of it nay be only implicitly sche
matized at the start of the conversation.

In the course of formulating

his thoughts what was only implicit becomes explicit.

If the subject is

a familiar one,of course, then his verbalizations are actually those of an
already symbolically structured schema and his speech flows out as a fluent
expression of a well-thought-out position.4
Whether communication has occurred, of course, depends only in part
upon the fact than an understanding has been given verbal expression.

As

noted before, only in so far as the process results in possibilities for
a restructured understanding on the part of the receiver can we say that
communication has taken place.

Church1s treatment of the subject provides

some further thoughts on how messages might come to be formulated and ex
pressed.

However, with regard to the problem of how they might be infer

red, there is nothing more in his account than a statement that, in some
manner, the listener Mputs onM the schema of the speaker.
In considering the possible nature of this inferring process on the
part of the receiver, it might be well to look for clues as to how it pro
ceeds in the discussion of symbolic understandings.

It is possible that

the very thing that makes them capable of being given symbolic expression
also provides the means by which they are inferred, namely the fact that
they consist in the use of conceptual frameworks.

Viewed in this way, the

problem seems to amount to answering the following questions what is there
about linguistically expressed conceptual frameworks that renders them
capable of being comprehended'— i.e., incorporated into an understanding?
One answer to the above question might be that an expressed
4Ibid.

-62conceptual framework is very readily and naturally apprehended, by virtue
of the fact that it is structured in accordance with the same rules by
which human thought is structured.

This answer is supported by a widely

held conception of human, symbolic thought in the social sciences, that
it is the exact counterpart of normal human speech.
To say that the structure of conceptual frameworks, as they have
been previously discussed, conforms to the rules of grammatical expression
in no way conflicts with anything that was said conderning their structure.
Before it was discussed as a relational “way of seeing things'1 in a mean
ingful configuration.

low the fact is simply added that, in achieving

coherent expression, these configurations must be structured in accordance
with the rules of grammar.

The vast topic of the restrictions imposed on

conceptual thought by our grammar, with its sharp distinctions between
things (named by nouns), their properties (adjectives), etc., cannot be
discussed here. Grammer is too large a subject to discuss either the re
strictions it inposes or the extent to which these restrictions are remov
ed or altered by languages constructed for that purpose, e.g., symbolic
logic and mathematical languages. Emphasis here is rather on the positive,
structural function which grammar plays in thought and speech.
To return to the discussion of what is involved in the receiver* s
process of inferring someone*s understanding, the above considerations
would seem to lend themselves to support a case for its being accomplished
in the following manner.

In symbolically formulating his thoughts, a

speaker is actually doing not one but two things.

He is expressing sym

bolic meaning contents and at the same time exhibiting grammatically and
syntactically how they fit together.

-63To speak of "exhibited structure” in human discourse might strike
one as a bit odd.

let it amounts to little more than saying that a mean

ingful configuration of concepts is as meaningful when given ordered ex
pression by someone else as when it is formulated in one’s own thought—
with one difference.

Thought is generally without commitment and conforms

with one*s value structure.

Understanding the verbal output of someone

else very often is lacking in one or both of these qualities.

But this

possible source of resistance to understanding is at least not directly
related to comprehending the meaning of the terms used.

Such valuative,

persuasive aspects of the problem go beyond present interests and need
not concern us here. For present purposes it is enough to say that there
is a perceivable structure as well as symbolic meaning contents in the
use of language.

It might be possible to conceive of such perceivable

structure as “instructions”:to a receiver as to how one1s thought is
ordered. Or, eliminating the impression of intentional behavior on the
part of a speaker, we might say that part of a person*s verbalizations
could be logically construed as “instructions” to structure the symbolic
meaning contents he is sending in a particular fashion.
The receiver’s inferring processes might be compared to the pro
cesses involved in a problem solving situation of the type discussed be
fore.

In both cases a person is faced with the task of obtaining the use

of a conceptual framework and with it an attained understanding.

Still

It mast be noticed that in the case of a receiver his attained understand
ing could differ from that of the person he is trying to understand.

But

by gaining the use of the particular conceptual framework communicated,and
with it gestural cues, he is able to infer the other’s understanding.

Perhaps now the reason for making the distinction between under
standings and conceptual frameworks has become clear. Although both are
to be thought of as mediating constructs, i.e., as "in” people, in the
present formulation the former is inferred from the latter.
latter is a vehicle of communication.

Only the

In the same way it was insisted

that symbolic meanings are not to be found in the world (i.e., they too
are mediating constructs).

let the symbol proper is capable of being ex

pressed even though its meaning is not.

Thus it can serve as a vehicle

of communication in a fashion completely analogous to that given as the
function of conceptual frameworks.

In both cases their expression in

messages serve to arouse meaningful responses in receiver’s.'5
Of course the problem solving analogy has some limitations, and it
might help clarify the present view ©f communication to point them out.
For one thing, in a problem solving situation, a person is attesting to
formulate a conceptual structure. In a communication situation of the
type under discussion, he is attempting to perceive a presented concept
ual structure. Moreover, the processes of the latter situation are much
less creative, much more automatic,than in the former situation— and this
because the symbols he hears are already expressed in a meaningful config
uration of relations.

Yet there is a danger in carrying this present line

of reasoning too far.

If it is true that symbolic meanings take part of

their meaning from and within the context in which they are used, then a
receiver must to some extent be striving to ascertain what precise meaning
%he communication of symbolic meanings by evoking meaning responses
in receivers is a very common conception of the process. Its use here is
more one of illustration and example than any new use of the conception.

-65a symbolic vehicle conveys within a particular conceptual framework. This
after all was the point of emphasizing that the distinguishing character
istic of symbolic meaning is not its explicitness of reference but its
preciseness of meaning and the versatility it allows in using that mean
ing.

The precise meaning used is required to be comprehended by means

of the contextual realtions a symbolic vehicle has with a conceptual framework taken as a whole.

6

Although more could be said concerning the above conception of com
munication (in the way of relating it specifically to the preceeding dis
cussion of understanding), further attention should be given to the scope
of communicative situations to which it is intended to apply.

Indication

has been given at times that what has been said of the communication of
conceptually structured understandings is not so narrowly conceived that
some things said of it could not also, in some ways, be applied to other
types of communicative situations.

However, the focus of the discussion

has been intended to apply only to those somewhat ideal situations where
in one person can be presumed to have a symbolically structured understand
ing and the intent of communicating it to another individual. Also, under
the ideal conditions intended to apply, it should be possible to assume
that the receiver is making a real effort to understand: the speaker. Ex
amples might be a teacher lecturing to a biology class on the subject of
evolution or a history professor exploring causes for the First World
^Such consideration of symbolic meanings in context, of course,
in some way involves prediction of an unfolding context in an on-going
discourse. Prediction of this type might be accounted for in terms of
the redundancy of language, e.g., the likelyhood of occurrence of the
next word in a sentence— or at least the next word type: noun, verb, ad
jective, etc., as predictable from grammatical structure.
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War, etc.
Oddly enough we cannot include a mathematics or science teacher
where their discourse might include the communication of mathematically
structured conceptual frameworks. While we have used discussions from
the philosophy of science throughout the present work, the treatment giv
en to symbolic meanings has not included numerical concepts.

Thus the

present formulation of the nature of human understanding is not complete
enough as it presently stands to apply to mathematical thought.

To in

any way deal adequately with understandings mediated by numerical con
cepts would require a detailed discussion of such concepts.
Instead of doing this (since such a discussion would necessarily
be rather long in length and in excess of present needs in discussing
the nature of conceptually structured understandings), something of the
opposite approach was taken.

Use was made of work already done along

lines of explaining the nature of scientific understanding in applying it
to the problem of obtaining a workable conception of everyday understand
ing. Fortunately, however, most of what would be needed in the way of
explicating the nature of mathematical understandings has already been
done by Cassirer and Hawkins.

It therefore seems reasonable to assume

that, once the needed explication of numerical concepts was included, the
above formulation could be extended to include the transfer of mathemati
cal conceptual structures as well.
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